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Introduction 
Intriguingly, it is often poetic and creative dis-
course that gets straight to the point of language 
and encourages our philosophical response. 
My article does not deal with poetic and crea-
tive discourses as such, but some preliminary 
remarks can be made about their ability to con-
front what academic convention simply cannot. 
In Baby No- Eyes (Grace, 1998), for instance, 
the central character, Baby, dies in an acci-
dent before her birth. She remains within the 
Wheiao (luminal space) for a long time as she 
has been inappropriately disposed of by medical 
authorities after the accident that caused her 
death. As her presence becomes noticeably more 
intrusive, Gran Kura instructs Baby’s brother: 
“Tell it to get out, tell it off properly, that’s 
what you do” (p. 239). Alongside the issues of 
dealing with body parts is the challenge posed 
by language on its own account. Baby’s brother 
in the quote is encouraged to draw upon lan-
guage as something other than just a transporter 
of rationalistic meaning. For all concerned in 
the novel, it is instead the stuff of the world—
all- pervasive, unconditioned. Patricia Grace’s 
novel perhaps displays this connection of lan-
guage to the sublime more than any rational 
treatment of the topic can: language is, after 
all, not constrained by academic orthodoxy; it 
is not reduced to a provable entity; and thus it 
can be allowed its extensive sway among other 
things in the world.
There is a dual nature to language, especially 
when it is as much a part of the seen and unseen 
worlds as it is for Mäori. It “resists comprehen-
sion because all approaches to it are already 
mediated by language” (O’Brien, 1995, p. 199). 
The challenge of talking about language whilst 
being in its thrall should not be too much of a 
deterrent, however, especially when the survival 
of Indigenous languages is as dependent on that 
sort of philosophical speculation as it is on the 
retention of those languages’ words and so on. 
In an era that appears to be concerned with the 
survival of Indigenous languages, language as 
a general phenomenon needs to be thought of 
as thoroughly connected to one’s worldview 
in order to ensure the survival of not just a 
particular vernacular but also one’s deep ori-
entation to the world. Here, I purposely depict 
language in a wider sense than simply its use in 
ceremony or its ‘precise’ rendition; I am argu-
ing instead for a philosophy of language for 
Mäori that considers language in its various 
forms—from general phenomenon to discrete 
word—to be dense with the full interplay of 
the world. As I do so, I note that one of the 
greatest deceptions imposed by colonization 
is that language is somehow separate from the 
complete whakapapa (genealogy) of the world 
and that it is simply a verbalized outcome of 
the mind that merely exists to scribe out one 
thing from its context. 
With those problems in mind, I propose a 
philosophy about one entity having always 
been constituted by all others and, with that, a 
conception of language that peers more keenly 
into the disclosure of the world than linguis-
tics, whilst acknowledging that signposts to a 
worlded proposition of language may be pos-
sible through an analysis of certain terms. I call 
this worldview ‘worlded perception’, and I add 
to the intricacy of that possibility by arguing 
that a Mäori holistic philosophy of language 
holds perception to present the world rather 
than just cognitively apprehend and represent 
it. This contention is based on oft- cited holistic 
utterances that retain the idea simultaneously 
as form. My intention here is to show that lan-
guage is immediately accompanied by all things; 
this proposition, though, asks for me to clarify 
the nature of that primordial accompaniment. 
I then turn to think about language as a general 
phenomenon for Mäori, and its complex ability 
to foreshadow an entity even as it adumbrates 
that thing’s backdrop. I consider the verb ‘to be’ 
in that light, arguing that a Mäori philosophy 
can identify language as a sort of gathering of 
entities rather than an instrument for singling 
out one thing as thoroughly and separably 
evident. 
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Mäori worldedness
Full attendance of the world within 
one entity
There is a Mäori philosophy that attributes a 
vitality and holism to things in the world. Pere 
(1982) talks about this phenomenon in terms of 
what sits outside of the everyday realm and yet 
is part of it, when she states that “nothing was 
done or attempted without some thought being 
given to the spiritual side of things” (p. 54), and 
Marsden (2003) addresses the full complement 
of the world when he insists that “the earth is 
not simply Papa (rock foundation) but Papa- 
tua- nuku (rock foundation beyond expanse, the 
infi nite)” (p. 22). A further and immediately 
related way of stating it is the following: that 
any one entity is immediately and actively con-
stituted by all things. Raerino (1999) describes 
an inseparability of the self from the natural 
world, leading “a great chief [to] speak of him-
self as the mountain or the river; these cannot 
be objectified or externalized. They are not 
‘out there’; but ‘in here’” (p. 73). In Mäori 
philosophy, this instant relationship is shown 
in the notion of ‘whakapapa’, which interre-
lates things in the world (Roberts et al., 2004). 
‘Whakapapa’ is therefore an immediate refer-
ence to the notion of ‘worlding’, a term which 
is immediately both noun and verb. The sort of 
relatedness I signal at this point connects with 
the idea that one thing is materially all others, 
although the rest of the world within the object 
may not be what the self has in mind. An object’s 
construction by all other things, such that they 
all diverge within that object and have become 
it, is somewhat different to the idea that things 
are merely connected yet are individual—com-
prising nodes on a wheel, interlinked through 
the spokes that move through them to other 
nodes, so to speak. This immediate attendance 
cannot be directly experienced because it is an 
example of what Marsden (2003) generally 
contends is beyond our perception. The a priori 
full attendance of all things always structures 
our subsequent perception of the world—that 
is, it sets limits on our experience—but, impor-
tantly for a Mäori worldview which privileges 
the vitality of a thing and its autonomy, it also 
exists independently of the mind. The totality 
of entities therefore exceeds the human self, yet 
it simultaneously engages with the speculative 
element, drawing the self on to ponder its pos-
sibilities and also establishing the horizons of 
that thinking. The collectivity of things in the 
world is utterly infl uential on the self, and just 
as signifi cantly the latter dwells in conjunction 
with all those other things. One entity is, in a 
sense, driven against or with the others so that 
even the space it occupies is collapsed immedi-
ately with that of the others. Its locus is thus 
interrelated and, having its own origin in the 
dually material and mysterious Papatüänuku/
Papa (Earth Mother) and all her related entities, 
is entirely engaged at all times with the world 
and those entities.
‘Whakapapa’ is also commensurate with 
notions of time, because Papatüänuku actively 
presents entities in their always- becoming 
nature. Any one entity always was correspond-
ent with all others. The word ‘always’ is not 
incidental in that idea, and we should at this 
point visit this ‘always’ premise that proves con-
fusing for dominant Western thought, which 
in general does not attribute entity status to 
concepts. This basic assumption is that, in 
Mäori thought, a concept and a real thing are 
equally material, with genealogy showing the 
link between the two (Mika & Stewart, 2015). 
Indeed, form and thought are the same, to the 
extent that they have forever been enmeshed. 
It should further be remembered here that the 
linearity of genealogy does not do justice to 
the simultaneity of things, and there exist deep 
problems with the straightforward notion that 
whakaaro (concept) eventually begets ähua 
(form) (Royal, 2012). A key Mäori philosophi-
cal concept is that, instead, past, present and 
future are collapsed, with the result that the 
genealogical (whakapapa) layout of entities 
(names and so on) is really an acknowledgement 
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of the complexity within any one particular 
entity being highlighted. 
Clearly this approach to an entity heralds 
a dramatically contrasting idea about time 
to that held by Western modernity. A domi-
nant Western philosophical response would 
probably be, in the fi rst instance, that Mäori 
are too wedded to superstitious thought and 
the entities that are that thought. Hence, we 
would seemingly be too superstitious in our 
thinking: we are pre- rational. This neo- Kantian 
proposition that argues for our apparent con-
ceptual immaturity is based on the idea that true 
philosophical thought comes about through 
a distance from the object. Cassirer (1953), 
for example, believed that a truly philosophi-
cal reflection on an object is blocked when 
a ‘primitive’ society clings to the thing itself. 
Language, that most basic means of expres-
sion, for that society is therefore replete with 
myth and further ensnares the primitive group 
in the world of appearances. Language is its 
object. An Indigenous retort, in turn, might be 
that the detachment from objects and their infi -
nite complexity is a sign of huge philosophical 
impoverishment, perhaps even being respon-
sible for the lack of wellbeing that seems to 
affl ict Western thought in so many ways, at 
least from an Indigenous perspective (see, e.g., 
Wildcat, 2001). A philosophical maxim that 
time separates phenomena from each other, 
placing them in a sequential line, is at the base of 
this Indigenous warning, because a philosophy 
of time structures the perception of the world by 
deciding how an object is to appear in advance. 
With a Mäori notion of time (wä), phenomena 
emerge at once, and the human self has no 
choice but to share in that ‘at- once’ existence. 
The presence of the imperceptible
While it is certainly diffi cult in colonized reali-
ties to escape Kant’s (1998) insistence that one 
should not speculate on the thing- in- itself and 
instead just make do with knowing that one 
has represented the thing without its totality, 
a Mäori worlding declares that simply resting 
with a shell of knowledge to form a shell around 
the thing is inadequate as an explanation of a 
full relationship with the thing and its world. 
The ingrained ‘thing’ may appear to be alone 
in the self’s representation but its constant and 
active merging with the world and its total 
complement of animate objects (even where 
they are deemed by the West to be inanimate 
[Deloria, 2001a]) indicates that the human 
self is constantly urged to speculate on the 
nature of a thing as thoroughly interrelated. 
The path of thought that I suggest the world as 
a whole confronts us with here is a convoluted 
one, and is scribed out by those things in the 
fi rst instance, so that our thinking is consti-
tuted and guided by them. In other words, our 
thinking is never distinct from the movement, 
revelation and recession of all things. Heidegger 
(1976) noted in relation to this lure that “what 
withdraws [as the most thought- provoking 
thing] in such a manner, keeps and develops 
its own, incomparable nearness” (p. 17). In 
a Mäori context, I aver that our inability to 
grasp the complete nature of any one thing in 
perception, simply because it is so much more 
complicatedly related to all other things, draws 
us on to inquire into such themes as: What is 
mätauranga Mäori (Mäori knowledge)? How 
is it that a Western worldview does not sit well 
within a Mäori context? What is the nature 
of an utterance for Mäori?—and so on. The 
paradox is that the things that limit our think-
ing call for us to contemplate them, with the 
result that we never fully transcend, or step 
outside, those things. This revelatory nature of 
things happens in a concrete way, and Royal 
(2008) encourages us to acknowledge the living 
world when he states that “he whakamïharo 
ngä ähuatanga o te Ao—arä, te whitinga o 
Tamanuiterä, te ngungurutanga o te tai, te 
päuritanga me te awatea—ënei tü ähuatanga 
o te Ao, he whakamïharo ki te titiro atu [the 
forms of the world are amazing—the movement 
of the sun, the lapping of the tide, the darkness 
and the light—these manifestations of the world 
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are amazing to see]” (p. 60) and relates the 
interplay of these phenomena to our thinking. 
I add that thinking (along with all other modes 
of existence) is also equally governed by the 
reorganization or movement of a distant entity 
as well. In relation to that proposition, the 
early German Romantic poet and philosopher 
Novalis (2007) would say, “What is think-
ing sensing etc. here—is burning, fermenting, 
thrusting etc. yonder” (p. 24). We can extrapo-
late two main facets to thinking here: fi rst, that 
it is not the only attribute of humanity that is 
governed by things; and, secondly, that we are 
directed to think not only by those things that 
we can perceive but also by those that remain 
beyond our senses. 
Language: A thing and its worlded 
enactment
Thus far, we can see that I have alternated 
between the problem of certainty and the pos-
sibility of mystery. Alongside the oscillation of 
one idea/form with another, there is another: 
the Mäori writer on any matter alights on one 
with the other in the background, carries the one 
towards the other, and is thus responsible for 
ensuring that things in the world are expressed 
as if they are one. Language is an organic and 
overall phenomenon and is an obvious partici-
pant in this interrelationship of self with the 
complexity of other things. Arguably, all ways 
of expression are ‘language’ in a Mäori sense; 
Heidegger (1971) also pushed for a view that 
language is its own master (but could not com-
pletely undermine what he himself described 
as the positing of language as human- centred 
and rational). This wider interpretation of lan-
guage would encompass that things have a 
sort of communication with each other and 
with the self, such that the self responds. In 
that more expansive approach to language, an 
intriguing homonym exists with the term ‘mea’, 
which is most frequently used to mean ‘to say’ 
but can mean simultaneously ‘thing, uncertain 
thing, think, soon’ (Williams, 1921). Where 
Indo- European languages strongly demarcate 
meanings between homonyms, for Mäori ter-
minology there may well be a cohesion that 
predicates or underlies all those terms, so that 
they all fall into a sense that accords with a 
Mäori worldedness of holism and interconnec-
tion. In the case of ‘mea’, an equally perplexing 
unity exists between entities, where to say or 
speak may indicate to manifest a thing, and the 
attendant world, in that utterance. The human 
self is not alone in this act; other things in the 
world have the power to speak (Moon, 2003) in 
accordance with their own essential autonomy, 
yet in accord with each other. The fact that 
‘mea’ also refers to something pending indicates 
perhaps that the human self has some way to 
go in catching up to that process: he or she is 
made aware of the ‘thing’ only at the time of 
thinking it, not prior to that step, when the thing 
has in fact already beckoned to the self and, in 
a certain oblique way, has spoken the human 
self (not just to the human self—the thing has 
claimed the human self by its revelation to him 
or her), who then goes on to respond. 
There are two main aspects to my approach 
with the term ‘mea’. First, there is an obscure 
method at work that uses the dictionary mean-
ings to attempt to briefl y unveil a potential for 
language; however, I am intent on not letting 
those meanings limit the potential of language 
or cut it off from the impact of the world’s 
entities. Language hence displays possibilities 
for particularly creative thought when the self 
is not constrained by the dictionary. Language 
as I have posited it is resonant with Frege’s idea 
of a ‘reference’ being accompanied by a ‘sense’ 
(see Klement, n.d.). From a Mäori perspec-
tive, the sense might be described in various 
ways, including ‘wairua’ (spirit), ‘mauri’ (life 
force) or ‘whakapapa’. The meanings of terms 
could either be read in consonance with their 
dictionary meanings, without identifying with 
a worldedness other than that prescribed by 
denotation, or they might be thoroughly bound 
with that sense that, for the self, is accessible 
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through speculative thought. Moreover, while 
one speculates on the possibilities of entities 
through language, those entities have claimed 
the self. On a personal note: I would hardly 
have turned to speculate on ‘mea’ if a certain 
confi guration of the world had not encroached 
on my thinking. Quite what that arrangement 
is at any one given time is well beyond my 
knowledge. What we are left with in language, 
then, is a non- rational approach to those things 
and thus to language itself.
Secondly and relatedly, I am saying some-
thing about language itself, on the basis of my 
thought on ‘mea’. Language—speaking, where 
‘a thing things’ (to revert to a Heideggerean 
expression), and immediate temporality—is 
shared by all entities and their active revelation, 
administration to, or construction of, all other 
things including the self. It is productive for 
thought, by urging the self onwards to speculate 
on the interconnected nature of the world. Any 
one term has this potential, and despite where 
the speaker wishes to point precisely to an entity 
through language, language nevertheless reveals 
a world for the speaker beyond what he or she 
wishes to say. Novalis said of language that it 
“is peculiar because it only concerns itself with 
itself” (as quoted in Bowie, 1997, p. 65). He 
saw the world’s uncertainty in language as the 
latter sets out to obscure what is made clear 
through the dictionary or the precise intent of 
the speaker, and he also sought to emphasize 
language as itself obscure. In both instances, the 
term, conveying the full essence of all things, 
urges the speaker on to excavate beneath its 
given (and comfortable) defi nition. If there is 
one way of referring to an entity that results 
in confusion, it is language, for the complete 
sum of entities provide us the latter in the fi rst 
instance. Language, then, cannot be used as a 
means of precisely describing that which offered 
it. Allowing the disclosure of entities, language is 
complicated by the unknowable dance between 
things in the world, with the result that there is 
always an “overplus of meaning” (Otto, 1958, 
p. 5) that the self simply cannot pin down. 
Any one thing, carrying with it the imprint of 
all others, retains to itself its own essence, so 
that all the self can fi nally describe is a vague 
impression of the thing. 
Abrams (1996) states of the Dogon tribe in 
Mali that “spoken language was originally a 
swirling garment of vapour and breath worn 
by the encompassing earth itself” (p. 87). This 
seemingly mysterious, omnipresent depiction 
of language would be shared by Mäori, and a 
Mäori proposition about language places lan-
guage most concretely in all things that exist. 
If, as I have suggested, language engages with 
the manifestation of all things in the world, 
then it is the totality of things that have made 
me concerned about the totality of things as 
an issue. When we speak, we hence utter the 
totality of the world, not simply a description 
of whatever it is we wish to discuss. Language 
therefore presents the all within whatever is 
our concern, and our concern is only there 
because of the all in language. This all is mate-
rial, and issues us with ideas about it through 
its speech to us, as Hohepa Kereopa has iden-
tifi ed (see Moon, 2003). A Mäori view of this 
phenomenon—which is essentially bound up 
with notions of mystery and (pervasively in 
the West) mysticism—would suggest that lan-
guage is thoroughly presentational, not just 
representational, because it manifests what may 
be called the All. Certainly the self can intend 
to represent one thing—say, for instance, a 
tree—through language, but language is more 
important for its ability to open up a clear-
ing where things manifest, alongside that act 
of saying what something is. Here, we can 
be mindful of Heidegger’s (1978) announce-
ment that everything we do is within language. 
Somewhat divergent from Heidegger, though, 
Mäori are more concerned with how the totality 
of things culminate in one utterance, or what 
the possibilities are in abstaining from saying 
anything. By this I mean that language plays a 
key role in expressing the engagement of enti-
ties with each other and with the self. Language 
as a whole should act in conjunction with this 
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totality of things, rather than seeking to single 
one thing out from its context as if that is its 
true nature. Its primary aim is not to distil the 
Aristotelian truth correspondence of a matter 
but to allow an entity and its culmination with 
others to manifest, and to offer the self some 
sort of comportment to all those entities.
In its pursuit of the entire world, language 
grasps the combined ‘dark matter’ of all things. 
The absence of entities in anything positively 
productive appears oxymoronic and, with 
that in mind, the Mäori writer Nepia (2012) 
and the author (Mika, 2012) have empha-
sized the importance of nothingness in various 
solid, seemingly banal, acts, such as writing. 
Mainly signalled in the worlded terms ‘kore-
kore’ (extreme nothingness/positive aspects) 
and ‘kore’ (nothingness), nothingness appears 
to have been largely overlooked in favour of 
bright clarity. Discussing an entity in terms 
of its graspable and permanent properties has 
consequences for those opaque, primordial 
yet everyday phenomena, and threatens to 
consign them to the realm of fancy. At least 
in academic convention, it is diffi cult enough 
to describe the fact that something arises or 
manifests (for instance, with ‘ira’ [there!]), let 
alone suggest that it holds some shadow aspect 
of its self away from our vision. However, it 
is a thing’s ungraspability that can draw the 
self on to think and subsequently utter. Within 
korekore and kore lies the potential for mys-
tery and amazement for the self, related to the 
non- presencing of aspects of the world. There 
is a particular philosophy at work here that 
does not comply with the demands of Kantian 
idealism or Cartesian rationalism. A Mäori 
worlded speculation would suggest that those 
primordial entities within all things in the world 
defy the thoroughgoing presence of an entity in 
language. Those entities push for the reign of 
nothingness and darkness as part of the entity 
being manifested through language. They, like 
the things they give rise to, are fundamentally 
unknowable and are nevertheless infl uential and 
constructive. The fact that they are unknowable 
suggests that they are conceptual issues as well 
as entities. Pihama (2001) notes that ‘kaupapa’ 
is an ancient notion: ‘papa’ refers to a ground 
or foundation (Marsden, 2003), and its initial 
disclosure (‘kau’) suggests it is as much to do 
with perception as it is a solid ground. It is this 
ground that gives rise to all things and that 
signals both the potential and the limitations 
of thinking.
Language: That something is
Korekore and kore share in Papa to the extent 
that they provide a strong emotive and specu-
lative backdrop to the world. They participate 
with Papa by ensuring that the self is con-
fronted with a non- foundational ground—one 
that ultimately cannot be fully understood or 
perceived. This ground is thus all- consuming, 
and is not really a ground at all in the sense 
that it is meant dominantly in English. It is 
instead pervasive, and if we were to imagine 
it geometrically at all then it might seem verti-
cal and confronting, rather than something 
underfoot or superfi cial. Kore and korekore are 
therefore existential terms relating to one’s con-
tinual, unavoidable encounter with the absence 
within a thing (Mika, 2013): they can result in 
a gloominess (pä- uri) for the self as the self is 
challenged by the out- of- bounds nature of the 
thing. This unobtainability of the thing, being 
its absence, may correspond conceptually with 
“dark matter” as “the dominant component 
of the physical Universe” for which “there is 
no persuasive theoretical explanation” (Cahn, 
2007, p. 2551). I suggest that, for Mäori, the 
darkness that Cahn speaks of is an emotional 
symptom of the active presence of invisibility to 
an entity. Alongside meaning ‘a lack of light’, 
it expresses the self’s encounter with a thing’s 
mystery—its hiddenness despite its appearance 
to the self. Thus, language for Mäori descends 
to the opaque depths of an object and its own, 
autonomous and full speech with the rest of 
the world. Language here tries to retain this 
complete array of the world as invisible while 
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referring to one thing, and the self is aware that 
there is a backdrop to the thing being discussed 
that simply cannot be grasped but that never-
theless confronts and infl uences the speaker. 
Silence also participates in that voidness, per-
haps by allowing that backdrop to manifest on 
its own, without the self’s demarcation of any 
one particular entity. Its importance in Mäori 
practice (Smith, 2007) arises from its refl ection 
of simple nothingness, and its ability to give 
form to the hinterland, on its own terms, of 
any object.
Language’s correspondence with things in 
the world and their interplay means that one 
term and its dominant use can disclose a great 
deal about how the world is to be approached 
and how its things are meant to relate. There 
are several possible examples here, with the 
most fascinating comprising those widely used 
ones that have become so embedded as to be 
overlooked. There is something about the Indo- 
European love of the verb ‘to be’, for instance, 
that both reveals and obstructs Being, depend-
ing on its use. When philosophers of language 
ask ‘What is language?’ then the verb ‘to be’ 
must be contended with. Somewhat ironically, 
the ‘what- ness’ of language, expressed in that 
question, is made the topic of concern through 
an aspect of language itself—in particular, ‘is’. It 
is a striking characteristic of the Mäori language 
that there is no such verb. There is undoubtedly 
a sense of ‘to be’ within our worldview, but 
our ability to point with certainty at a thing by 
saying what it is, is somewhat measured, and I 
suspect that this de- emphasis of the one thing 
shows itself in our language. Analytic views 
on language, which since Locke have placed 
ideational signifi cance on language so that it 
is merely an expression of the content- bearing 
mental state of the speaker at the time (Lycan, 
2000, p. 78) and which have remained domi-
nant, rely especially heavily on the copula to 
represent that mental picture, and saying what a 
thing is asserts something about the thing in its 
self- evidence, detaches it from its context, and 
makes it utterly present to the self. Lamenting 
the problems associated with the forgetting of 
a deeper notion of ‘to be’, Hart (2013) contem-
plates the following, which is worth quoting at 
length here:
Derrida . . . links this confl ation of these two 
uses of “to be”—grammatical and lexical—to 
themes in the history of Western philosophy. 
It is the “full- fledged” use that Heidegger 
claims to seek to recover when he suggests 
that being has become both compromised 
and effaced: “‘Being’ remains barely a sound 
to us, a threadbare appellation. If nothing is 
left to us, we must seek at least to grasp this 
last vestige of a possession.” This nostalgia 
for a return to the use of to be as existence 
is echoed, Derrida asserts, by Benveniste: 
“It must have had a defi nite lexical meaning 
before falling—at the end of a long historical 
development—to the rank of ‘copula.’ . . . We 
must restore its full force and its authentic 
function to the verb ‘to be’ in order to meas-
ure the distance between a nominal assertion 
and an assertion with ‘to be’. The copula thus 
transcends the grammatical categories of par-
ticular languages . . . the “full fl edged” notion 
of to be cannot be a category determined by 
language if it is to be possible to return from 
the effaced use of being to its “full force” and 
“authentic function”. (p. 58) 
For Mäori, the problem is deepened because 
there is no copula to begin with. Hart, as we 
have seen, contends that the copula could act 
in one’s existential favour if its significance 
is discovered, but clearly, whilst it acts out a 
reductionist role, it is capable of endorsing a 
reductionist worldview. Thus, any worldview 
that understates the idea that one thing could 
be represented in isolation to others is placed 
at risk through the introduction of a seemingly 
universal small verb and its historical twists and 
turns. In the case of the Mäori language, the 
verb ‘to be’ is implied in certain grammatical 
particles, such as ‘he’ and ‘ko’ together with 
the rest of the sentence featuring each particle. I 
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would add that, imputed into Mäori usage, the 
verb injects a false belief that what one wishes 
to discuss is all that there is to the discussion. 
Here, we may recall Derrida (1982) weighing 
in on the problem when he recalls Aristotle’s 
role in “think[ing] time on the basis of ousia 
as parousia, on the basis of the now, the point, 
etc.” (p. 61). Derrida proposed that there are 
no self- suffi cient identities; they all involve their 
others, which are absent. The metaphysics of 
presence, as he would call this deep focus on 
what is before the self in all its solidity, engages 
with a set of positive hierarchies (Biesta, 2010) 
that ensure that a conception and its language 
draw on a notion of presence and “always 
[amount] . . . to reconstituting the same system 
[of Being of presence]” (Derrida, 1982, p. 60). 
Presence, that great Western unconscious pre-
occupation, does not acknowledge its absent 
partner. 
But how can anything other about language 
be proposed, from a Mäori perspective, when it 
is so tightly governed by preconditioned ideas 
of time and rigidity? What could language pos-
sibly be if it is not highly present? What about 
its ‘isn’t- ness’? The questions are brought about 
in part by the initial appearance of the ‘is’, so 
we have to deal with the ‘is’ while proposing 
something other about language. There is one 
issue that asks to be dealt with here, before we 
attempt to answer those questions. The fact that 
I am asking that latter question, in particular, 
shows a concern about language. Yet, it is lan-
guage itself that has shown the concern about 
itself: language has provided a means for me 
to orient towards it. The fact that language is 
asks for my attention, and so my concern is not 
so much about language as within language. 
Interestingly, I have drawn on the verb ‘to be’ 
to explain that phenomenon: that language is, 
is participatory with the copula. That some-
thing is, not what it is, may very well be tied 
to the “full force” of the copula that Hart has 
spoken of. In Mäori thought, the fact of lan-
guage’s existence, and the conundrum of access 
to speculation on that fact through language, 
asks for the self to account immediately for his 
or her immersion in that act of speculating. For 
instance, I cannot philosophize on the fact of 
language without acknowledging the infl uence 
of my origins from Te Arawa, the impact of 
place in general (see Deloria, 2001b), and then 
of the place in which I am speculating about lan-
guage, and so on, including the unfathomable 
connection between all these. My expression 
at any one time could very well be infl uenced 
by something that Western academic considers 
only nebulously connected to the self, including 
a geographical phenomenon, the activities of 
another group of people, and so on. In Mäori 
philosophy, the possibilities here are disconcert-
ingly infi nite—disconcerting because they run 
counter to a project of empiricism that domi-
nant Western thought and practice insist on. 
Despite the liberating potential of the verb 
‘to be’ for the West if its existential sense is 
recaptured, it is not mandatory for specula-
tion on the mystery of a thing. That something 
is does not require the verb ‘to be’ in order to 
speculate. In a Mäori context, the astonishment 
at the fact that something arises or manifests 
itself is different to saying what it is, and is 
displayed in a number of ways. Various Mäori 
terms, I argue, express the immediate involve-
ment of the self within an utterance, and thus 
the sublime nature of an entity in its participa-
tion with all others. The term ‘ira’, for instance, 
is ‘essence’ only insofar as it indicates the sur-
prise that things manifest (Mika, 2015). Yet 
‘ira’ also incorporates one’s own existence in 
relation to the phenomenological surprise that 
‘ira’ portrays about other phenomena: How 
could one possibly discuss ‘ira’ as a separate 
phenomenon when the term also indicates one’s 
own intrinsic selfhood at the same time? That 
things are ‘there’ and the self’s direct relation-
ship to that fact are hence real concerns for 
the self. ‘Whakapapa’ also proposes that there 
exists a collapse of the self with all that the 
self is related to: it is not so much genealogical 
as continuously infl uential. ‘Ako’ indicates a 
particular vulnerability of the self in relation to 
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the external world (Thrupp & Mika, 2012); it 
is not always such a straightforward indicator 
of ‘teach/learn’, even if they are simultaneous. 
And in the absence of any particular term is the 
fact that the Mäori self also is, resonating with 
particular concerns about presence and absence 
and also with such enduring philosophical and 
social issues as colonization and tradition.
Conclusion
The point of speculative philosophy for Mäori, 
I believe, is to cast a cynical eye towards com-
mon sense whilst proposing something else. 
Both exercises demand a particular regard for 
language—not just for its discrete terms and 
syntaxes, its correct or even deliberately incor-
rect uses, as important as these are, but for the 
nature of language itself. Importantly though, 
language’s relationship with Mäori worlding of 
things and with our notion of ‘ground’ places 
limitations on what we can say definitively 
about language. Any philosopher of language 
is hence accosted by language, forced to speak 
of, yet within, it, and at the same time is pushed 
away from knowing it in its entirety. The curi-
ous distance that language seems to provide us 
with, when we seem to talk about language as 
Mäori, has always already been made proxi-
mate by the fact that language is materially 
constituted by all things in the world that are 
animate. It remains the role of speculative lan-
guage, and its intention to philosophize, to 
tentatively account for both the utterance and 
the visible/invisible worlds that Mäori treasure. 
It is also the task of the language philosopher 
to remain open to the infl uence of language as 
an entity- fi lled phenomenon that may decide 
to disclose different facets of itself at its whim, 
and to be prepared for the uncertainty attending 
that revelation.
Glossary
ähua form
ako teach/learn/existential 
vulnerability
he/ko particles of speech
ira essence/“there!”
kaupapa platform/conceptual base
kore nothingness
korekore extreme nothingness/
positive aspects
mätauranga knowledge
mauri life force
mea say, thing, think, soon
Papatüänuku/Papa Earth Mother/
continuously 
encountered ground
pä- uri darkness/gloom
wä time/space
wairua spirit
whakaaro think, thought
whakapapa genealogy, layer, 
worlding/worlded
Wheiao liminal space
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